Condonation of Delay Under Limitation Act: Supreme Court Guidelines

In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, [2013 INSC 620], the Supreme Court laid down consolidated guidelines for condoning delay in filing appeals and other proceedings under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as follows:

1. There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
2. The term “sufficient cause” should be understood in its proper spirit, philosophy and purpose, regard being had to the fact that this term is basically elastic and is to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
3. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled-for emphasis.
4. No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay, but gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
5. Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
6. It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief, because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuality there is no real failure of justice.
7. The concept of a liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness, and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
8. There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former the doctrine of prejudice is attracted, whereas to the latter it may not be. That apart, the former warrants a strict approach, whereas the latter calls for liberal delineation.
9. The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration, since the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties, and this principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of a liberal approach.
10. If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation.
11. It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of the law of limitation.
12. The entire gamut of facts is to be carefully scrutinised, and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion, which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
13. The State, a public body, or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

The Bench added four further principles to the above, namely:

• 1. An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner, harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to the justice-dispensation system.
  2. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner, on the basis of individual philosophy, which is basically subjective.
  3. Though no precise formula can be laid down, regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made, as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
  4. The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter, and, hence, exhibit a lackadaisical propensity in a nonchalant manner, requires to be curbed — within legal parameters, of course.