Condonation of Delay Means
The Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allows courts to admit an appeal or application after the prescribed period (on condoning the delay) if the applicant shows “sufficient cause”.
The term Sufficient Cause means adequate or enough to answer the purpose intended. It proves that the party did not act carelessly, sleep on their rights, or remain inactive. Delay cannot be excused automatically through equity, sympathy, or a lenient approach when the applicant is negligent or lacks diligence. The use of words “may be admitted” in the Section indicates that the Courts have vast discretionary power under this section.
Guidelines Issued by the Supreme Court
In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, [2013 INSC 620], the Supreme Court laid down consolidated guidelines for condoning delay in filing appeals and other proceedings under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as follows:
- There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
- The term “sufficient cause” should be understood in its proper spirit, philosophy and purpose, regard being had to the fact that this term is basically elastic and is to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
- Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled-for emphasis.
- No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay, but gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
- Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
- It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief, because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuality there is no real failure of justice.
- The concept of a liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness, and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
- There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former the doctrine of prejudice is attracted, whereas to the latter it may not be. That apart, the former warrants a strict approach, whereas the latter calls for liberal delineation.
- The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration, since the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties, and this principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of a liberal approach.
- If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation.
- It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of the law of limitation.
- The entire gamut of facts is to be carefully scrutinised, and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion, which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
- The State, a public body, or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
The Bench added four further principles to the above, namely:
- An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner, harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to the justice-dispensation system.
- An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner, on the basis of individual philosophy, which is basically subjective.
- Though no precise formula can be laid down, regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made, as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
- The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter, and, hence, exhibit a lackadaisical propensity in a nonchalant manner, requires to be curbed — within legal parameters, of course.
Important Judgments on Condonation of Delay
- In Ramlal, Motilal & Chotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 361), the Supreme Court held that while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, two important considerations need to be made: firstly, in case of expiry of prescribed period of prescription, a right in favor of the decree-holder arises, according to which the decree can be treated as binding between the parties, and secondly, if sufficient cause of delay in filing appeal has been given, it is the Court’s discretion to condone the delay and admit the appeal.
- Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987): The Supreme Court held that the expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal and justice-oriented construction. The court stressed that substantial justice should prefer over technical considerations, and a pragmatic approach should be adopted instead of pedantic reasoning.
- N Balkrishnan v. M Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123]: The Supreme Court observed that sufficient cause has to be construed liberally especially when the delay is not deliberate and malafide. The Court added that the length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
- Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013): The Supreme Court clarified that “sufficient cause” cannot be interpreted liberally if negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides is writ large. Courts have no power to condone delay on equitable grounds if statutory limitation is ignored without justification.
- Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012): The Supreme Court ruled that government bodies and public departments cannot claim a separate or lenient yardstick for condoning long delays unless acceptable, satisfactory explanations are provided for official inaction.
Conclusion
Law of limitation is based on public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself. A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time.
The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense, whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally. In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence.
Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal.
Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay, and delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.