HCK consolidates reasons for discharge
The High Court of Kerala (HCK), in Vazhuthacaud R.Narendran Nair v State Of Kerala, discharged an advocate, against whom charge has been framed by the Court of the Enquiry Commissioner & Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram regarding legal scrutiny of documents relating to a property loan, by citing some key judgements on discharge and framing of charge in a warrant case.
This write-up consolidates the judgements stated in the above judgement issued in a Criminal Revision Petition.
Discharge & framing of charge
The Sections 239 and 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) deal with discharge and framing of charge. The discharge of the accused arises when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless.”
The Section 239 envisages a careful and objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law. But, if the Judge, upon considering the records, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the opinion that there is “ground for presuming” that the accused has committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The order for framing of charge is also not an empty or routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section 239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. (See: V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI (AIR 1980 SC 962).”
Frame charges when there is a prima facie case
The primary consideration at the stage of framing charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case. At this stage the probative value of materials on record is not to be gone into.
Case laws on discharge or framing of charge
In Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another [(2008) 2 SCC 561], while considering the nature of evaluation to be made by the Supreme Court (SC) at the stage of framing of charge, held that “at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the Accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the Accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”
In State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659], while dealing with the question of framing charge or discharge, the SC held that “if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the Accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the Accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.”
In State of M.P. v Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338] the SC held that “The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the Accused.”
In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [(2013) 11 SCC 476], the SC observed that while framing charges the Court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. It was further held that the Court cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations, contradictions and inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses at the stage of discharge.
In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(AIR 1980 SC 52)], the SC states, “At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”
In State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru v. M.R.Hiremath [(2019) 7 SCC 515], the SC held the “High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 Cr.P.C. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence.
In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan (2014) 11 SCC 709), adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, SC held, “At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the Accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the Accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the Accused has committed the law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”
In State through Deputy Superintendent of Police v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors. (AIR 2022 SC 4218), the SC, while dealing with the scope of Section 239 Cr.P.C., held that the Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that if “the Magistrate considers the charge against the Accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the Accused. The word ‘groundless’, in our opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the Accused has committed the offence. The word ‘groundless’ used in Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means that the materials placed before the Court do not make out or are not sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the Accused” ….
This would not be the stage for weighing the pros and cons of all the implications of the materials, nor for sifting the materials placed by the prosecution- the exercise at this stage is to be confined to considering the police report and the documents to decide whether the allegations against the Accused can be said to be “groundless”.
When discharge takes place
Therefore, the obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 Cr.P.C. arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless that is, there is no legal evidence or when the facts are such that no offence is made out at all and no detailed evaluation of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken.
At the stage of framing charges, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Special Judge, which leads him to form presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offences alleged, may justify the framing of charges.
In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya and Others [(1990) 4 SCC 76], the SC held that at the Sections 227-228 stage the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
- In V.C.Shukla v. Statethrough C.B.I. (1980 SCC (Cri) 695), the SC says :”There can be no doubt that the stage of framing of the charges is an important stage and the court before framing the charge has to apply its mind judicially to the evidence or the material placed before it in order to make up its mind whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. But this case is not an authority for the proposition that once the court, after considering the materials, passes an order framing the charges, the order is a final order which could be revised and would not be barred under Section 397(2) of the Code which, however, did not exist at the time when the decision was given. It follows therefore that an order framing a charge was clearly revisable by the High Court under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of 1898. We may, however, point out that we are in complete agreement with the principle, involved in the cases discussed above, that an order framing charges against an accused undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial and it is the duty of the court to apply its judicial mind to the materials and come to a clear conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out on the basis of which it would be justified in framing charges.”
Key principles that emerge from the case laws
- That the Judge, while considering the question of framing charges under the CrPC, has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
- Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused, which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
- The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application.
- That in exercising his jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 239 of the CrPC, the Judge cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
- If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.
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