Recovery of material object u/s 27 IEA is admissible
The Section 27 the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) states that so much of information obtained from the accused when he/she is in police custody leading to the recovery of any fact alone, is admissible.
The Section 27 IEA is an exception to the total bar on considering the confession to the police in general, under Sections 25 and 26 of the IEA.
That means, except the information that led to the discovery of a fact or material object, any other information given to the police by an accused, while he/she is in police custody is inadmissible. The statement under this Section made to the police when the accused was not in custody or its equivalent, is also inadmissible.
What the Section 27 of IEA states
The Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states is that the information received from the accused must lead to the discovery of a fact and the information so received must relate to the fact so discovered.
In other words, what the Section 27 says is that the part of the fact or statement which leads to the discovery of a fact in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence, relating to the fact thereby discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused.
The principle underlying the Section 27 IEA
The principle underlying the Section 27 of the IEA is that if the confession of the accused in the form of a statement to police is followed or supported by the discovery of the fact, it may be presumed to be true.
The truth of the statement is guaranteed by the discovery of the facts consequent to giving the information to the police officer by the accused.
Pallukuri Kottaya & Others v Emperor: A classic judgement
The condition necessary to bring the Section 27 IEA into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police Officer must be deposed to by the Police Officer and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused whether it amounted to a confession or not (Pulukuri Kottaya and others v Emperor (AIR 1947 Privy Council 67)).
The decision in Pulukuri Kottaya was accepted with approval by the Supreme Court (SC) in various decisions and that decision has now become locus classicus.
The discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence ( Udai Bhan Rai v State of U P and Others : AIR 1994 SC 1603).
The fact must be discovered in consequence of the information or statement received from the accused in custody. If no fact is discovered the statement given to the police is not admissible.
The connection of the offence to the thing discovered has to be proved separately to make it relevant. The discovery must be of some fact about which the police should not have any previous information from any other source.
The discovery of the fact or material object has no relevance at all if it is not connected with or relevant to the offence.
Statement of the accused can be taken u/s 161 CrPC
The statement of the accused regarding the recovery of the material object can be recorded under Section 161 CrPC but need not be under Section 27 IEA.
A police officer conducting the investigation can question anyone acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the offence and therefore that can lead to the discovery of facts and consequent recovery of the object.
IO should narrate in the court what the accused stated to him
In Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v State of Karnataka [2024 INSC 320], the SC while relying on the judgement in Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v State of AndhraPradesh [(1983) 1 SCC 143] states that the statement of an accused recorded by a Police Officer under Section 27 of the IEA is basically a “memorandum of confession” of the accused recorded by the Investigating Officer (IO) during interrogation which has been taken down in writing (see para 62).
When the Investigating Officer (IO) steps into the witness box for proving such disclosure statement, he would be required to narrate what the accused stated to him.
The IO essentially testifies about the conversation held between himself and the accused which has been taken down into writing leading to the discovery of incriminating facts. The part of the statement which distinctly leads to the extent it leads to the discovery of fact is admissible in evidence.
The SC adds that if the Investigating Officer gives no description at all of the conversation which had transpired between himself and the accused which was recorded in the disclosure statement, then such disclosure statements cannot be read in evidence and the recoveries made in furtherance thereof are non est in the eye of law.
Incriminating information cannot be taken from accused
When an incriminating information is received from the accused, only that part of the statement, which leads directly to the fact so discovered alone, is admissible but nothing else is admissible.
The information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” leads to the discovery the knife concealed, it means that the informant has information of concealment of knife. If the knife is used in the offence the fact so discovered is very relevant. If the statement is added with the words “with which I stabbed” those words are inadmissible as it relates not to the discovery of the knife. But the mere statement that the accused led the police and the witnesses to the place where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information given.
If no information provided by the accused was recorded by the investigation officer and the accused leading the Investigation officer to the spot and pointing out the weapons leading to the recovery of them, it is not at all admissible.
Signature of the accused not necessary
It is not necessary on the part of the investigating officer to get the signature of the accused on a confessional statement recorded for the purpose of Section 27 of the IEA.
Even if the accused resiles from the statement that leads to the discovery of an object that statement would remain valid ( Kartar Singh v State of Punjab : AIR 1993 SC 341).
To prove the statement made under Section 27 of the IEA, the police officer will have to state the words used by the accused in his/her disclosure statement.
The term fact discovered does not refer to the object discovered
The term fact discovered used under Section 27 IEA does not refer to or is not equivalent to the object discovered and produced. The discovery of fact is connected to the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the accused regarding it. The statement should disclose the authorship of concealment and the factum of concealment.
The word fact as contemplated in Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is not limited to the actual physical material object, and it includes mental awareness or the knowledge of the accused as to its existence, says the SC.
The SC, in its judgment in Vasanta Sampat Dupare v State of Maharashtra, categorically states that it is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word fact as contemplated in Section 27 of IEA is not limited to actual physical material object.
Taking the accused to discover the object inadmissible
A statement in the police report that the accused led the police and witnesses to the place where he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the information deposed before the police by the accused. Hence such a statement is not admissible under Section 27 IEA.
Only those parts of the statement that lead to the discovery would be legal evidence and the rest must be rejected ( Mohd Inayatullah v State of Maharashtra : AIR1976 SC 483).
Information u/s 27 IEA is not substantive evidence
When the information as to the discovery of object under Section 27 of IEA is admitted in evidence, it does not constitute substantive evidence, but only be corroborative evidence to show that the accused was aware of the whereabouts of the weapon.
Disclosure must be voluntary and not under threat
The disclosure leading to the recovery must be voluntary and should not be made under duress, threat or pressure by the police officer.
If the recovery of weapon was made not in pursuance of prior disclosure statement, then such a recovery has no evidentiary value and hence is inadmissible.
If the recovery was made without recording the statement of the accused, then that recovery cannot be valid under Section 27 of the IEA.
Recovered article must be sealed soon
If the recovered articles are not sealed immediately, then that has no much evidentiary value.
However, the sealing of the article was not possible at that place immediately due to heavy rain and darkness such a seizure cannot be held doubtful, particularly when witnesses were present and tampering was not done.
To attract Section 27, the person need not be an accused
There is a misconception that in order to become an information relating to recovery valid under Section 27 of the IEA, the person deposing the fact to the police should have been made an accused.
Quite contrary, at the time of furnishing the information the person need not necessarily be accused of an offence. It is sufficient that he is subsequently be made an accused.
Authorship of concealment is not sine qua non
Similarly, in order to bring the case under Section 27 of IEA, it is not necessary that the accused himself should be the person who concealed the object. It is enough that he is aware of the concealed object. There is no doubt that authorship of concealment is admissible under Section 27 of IEA according to various decisions of the SC.
However, a three Judge Bench of the High Court of Kerala in Soj v State, while interpreting various decisions of the SC in the issue, categorically states the following: –
- none of the decisions of the SC deviated from Pulukuri Kottaya judgment (a classic one) as to the meaning of the expression fact discovered pursuant to the information given by the accused and admissible under Section 27 of IEA and
- none of the SC decisions held that authorship of concealment is sine qua non for admissibility of disclosure statement made by the accused under Section 27 IEA.
On the other hand, the decisions indicate that even in cases where authorship of concealment was wanting, evidence regarding information which led to the discovery was admitted under Section 27 of IEA.
If the information as deposed to by the Investigating Officer is otherwise admissible in evidence it would not become inadmissible solely for the reason that the information deposed by the Police Officer does not reveal authorship of concealment.
In other words, authorship of concealment is not sine qua non for admissibility of the statement of the accused under Section 27 of the IEA.
To convict u/s 27, the fact must not be known before
To convict an accused based on the statements made under Section 27 of the IEA, the SC says that the prosecution must establish the fact that the discovery of the evidence based on the statement made by the accused, under Section 27 of the IEA must not be known to anyone, before the information was given by the accused (see Ravishankar Tandon v State of Chhattisgarh : 2024 INSC 299).
But the recovery of the incriminating article can be from a place which is open or accessible to others would not vitiate the evidence under Section 27 of the IEA, as per Santhosh @Chandu v State [ 2024 (2) KLT 540].
Recovery can be from place accessible but not known to others
In Ibrahim Musa Chauhan @ Baba Chaouhan & Others v State of Maharashtra, the SC held that there is nothing in Section 27 of the IEA which renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the article was made from any place which is open to or accessible to others. In fact, the crucial question is whether it was ordinary visible to others but not whether the place was accessible to others or not.
If the place is not ordinarily visible to others, then it is immaterial even if the place where the weapon is concealed is accessible to others.
The Kerala High Court relies on this judgement while deciding the case in Santhosh @ Chandu v State [ 2024 (1) KLD 714].
In short, the Section 27 of the IEA says
What the Section 27 of the IEA says is that in cases where the accused, while in custody of the police, discloses the place of concealment of the weapon and from such disclosure of information, if the police recover the weapon from the hiding place without any assistance or participation of the accused, or with the accused lead the police in recovering the weapon, it would fall under Section 27 of the IEA.
But if the accused does not disclose the fact of concealment of the weapon while in custody and leads the police party to the hiding place, and takes out the weapon from the exact spot, that does not fall under Section 27 of the IEA. It is only a fact falling under section 8 of the IEA.
That means, the essential ingredient of Section 27 of the IEA is that the information given by the accused while in custody (need not be physical custody) must lead to the discovery of the fact which is direct outcome of such information.
Discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which it was produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. The factum of discovery combines both the physical object as well as the mental consciousness of the accused person.
References
- The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
- Pulukuri Kottaya and others v Emperor [AIR 1947 Privy Council 67]
- Udai Bhan Rai v State of U P & Others [AIR 1994 SC 1603)
- Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar & Others v State of Karnataka [2024 INSC 320]
- Kartar Singh v State of Punjab : [AIR 1993 SC 341]
- Vasanta Sampat Dupare v State of Maharashtra,
- Mohd Inayatullah v State of Maharashtra [AIR1976 SC 483]
- Soj v State of Kerala
- Ravishankar Tandon v State of Chhattisgarh [2024 INSC 299]
- Santhosh @Chandu v State [ 2024 (2) KLT 540]
